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 Having an Audience with the Magistrate 
Ernest Metzger, Douglas Professor of Civil Law, University of 
Glasgow 
Abstract.  During the classical period of Roman law, civil lawsuits were 
divided into two proceedings: a brief proceeding before the magistrate, 
who decided certain preliminary matters, and a longer proceeding before a 
judge, who tried the case. The first proceeding is said to take place “in 
iure,” which roughly means “in the magistrate’s court.” Unfortunately the 
figure “in court” has been understood too strictly to refer to the whole of 
the first phase, and this has given rise to the misunderstanding that the 
whole of the first phase took place in the magistrate’s presence.  The 
better view is that the first phase took place both in, and around, the 
magistrate’s tribunal.  This paper discusses several institutions of Roman 
civil procedure where the better view is evident.  The paper concludes with 
a discussion of a first-century settle agreement from Puteoli; the 
settlement agreement illustrates the better view. 
This paper was given at the conference: “Spaces of Justice in the Roman 
World,” hosted by the Center for the Ancient Mediterranean, Columbia 
University, November 16-17, 2007. 
A CIVIL lawsuit in classical Rome began with a short proceeding 
before the praetor, who helped the parties to compose their claims 
and defenses before he handed the matter over to a judge for 
trial.1 The same short proceeding took place in the courts of 
provincial governors and local judicial magistrates in small towns 
in Italy and the empire. The Roman sources use the term in iure 
to refer to this proceeding. The term broadly means “in court” or 
more precisely “in the magistrate’s court.”2 The modern literature 
has adopted the term, perhaps too hastily, to refer to the whole of 
the first phase, distinct from the second phase, before the judge.3 
Yet to use the term in this way suggests that the parties, from the 
beginning of the lawsuit to the conclusion of the first phase, are 
 
1 Here and elsewhere ‘classical Rome’ refers to Rome from the late 
republic to the middle third century CE. This marks a period in which the 
formulary procedure prospered and then declined, and is conspicuous for 
the great juristic works it produced, as well as a refined machinery of 
private justice. 
2 See e.g. D.1.1.11 (Paul., 14 Ad Sab.): Alia significatione ius dicitur 
locus in quo ius redditur, appellatione collata ab eo quod fit in eo ubi fit. 
3 See e.g. Arangio-Ruiz (1935) 3; Cannata (1982) 142-52; Cervenca 
(1983) 54; Seidl (1962) 161. To use the term in this way is not wrong, just 
an unfortunate shorthand.   
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“in the magistrate’s court.” The true picture is more complicated. 
During the first phase, the parties participated in a series of 
events, some taking place under the magistrate’s supervision, 
others taking place privately, and still others taking place 
privately but with the magistrate’s influence ever present. In 
short, not every event in the first phase took place “in the 
magistrate’s court.” 
This would be nothing more than a point of terminology, but 
for the fact that the underlying assumption (“the first phase takes 
place in the magistrate’s court”) has so strongly affected our 
reading of the evidence and ultimately our reconstruction of 
Roman civil procedure. If the whole of the first phase took place 
before the magistrate, then any activity outside his presence, even 
activity that was obviously forensic in nature, was not properly 
part of the litigation. As it happens, much of this activity survives 
to us in documents. We therefore risk interpreting these 
documents without due appreciation of their relationship to the 
law of procedure. At worst, we risk interpreting them as examples 
of purely private decision-making. More generally, if the only 
meaningful events took place in the magistrate’s presence, it is 
difficult to know where matters stood if the parties, for one reason 
or another, did not win an audience. Was their suit aborted? Was 
it “carried over” to the next sitting? 
Until recently the common view stood by the proposition that 
a lawsuit’s first phase took place entirely in the magistrate’s 
court, and avoided any difficulties by drawing a very simplified 
picture of the proceedings. It was the common view that when a 
defendant had been summoned in ius, the parties appeared before 
the praetor straight away, and that the proceeding was usually 
completed on the day it began.4 This simplified picture relied on a 
very small quantity of evidence, much of it drawn from the Digest. 
The evidence of the Digest, unfortunately, reflects the interests 
and priorities of Justinian’s compilers, who not surprisingly were 
more interested in what magistrates did, and in the sources of the 
magistrates’ authority, than in detailing day-to-day litigation in a 
system that had all but disappeared three hundred years earlier. 
Nevertheless, new evidence eventually improved our 
understanding, and the death of the common view’s simplified 
 
4 See e.g. Talamanca (1990) 325-326: “Il convenuto vocatus in ius è 
tenuto a comparire immediatamente dinanzi al magistrato […] Dopo che 
le parti erano comparse dinanzi al pretore, la fase in iure della procedura 
si esauriva generalmente nel giorno stesso della presentazione.” Compare 
Kelly (1966) 119 (doubting that cases could typically have passed through 
the in iure stage in a single day). 
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picture we owe largely to the discovery of waxed tablets from 
Herculaneum and Puteoli.5 These documents record a great 
variety of different forensic transactions: oaths, stipulations, 
settlements, notice-giving, and many others. The old common 
view is hardly recognizable in this new evidence. 
This essay discusses the mixed public and private nature of 
the first phase of a civil lawsuit in classical Rome. It presents a 
sample of evidence in order to underscore the misunderstanding 
in the statement “the first phase takes place in the magistrate’s 
court.” At bottom the misunderstanding is a confusion of space 
and time. A person can be actively engaged in a live lawsuit, 
properly commenced under the rules of the civil law, but 
nevertheless not in the presence of a magistrate. The phrases “in 
court” and “out of court,” though commonly used in discussing 
Roman litigation, are ambiguous, referring as they do either to 
the state of being in litigation, or being in a certain space. The 
opening sections of this essay give a brief sketch of the first phase 
of a civil lawsuit while highlighting a few examples of events that 
are respectively private, in iure, or hybrid. The last section briefly 
examines a single document from Puteoli. The document records 
an oath, and the time and place of the oath nicely illustrate how 
two parties, even outside the magistrate’s presence, are yet in the 
thick of litigation. 
 
5 The two finds contain collections of waxed wooden tablets that 
were originally attached as diptychs and triptychs. (This essay follows 
convention and refers to whole of the diptych or triptych as a “document.”) 
The tablets from Herculaneum were discovered in the 1930s; texts were 
first published in the late 1940s and 1950s under the editorships of 
Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli and Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz. In recent years 
Giuseppe Camodeca has re-edited many of these tablets, and a new 
edition is forthcoming. A catalogue of the Herculaneum tablets may be 
found in Rowe (2001), along with a bibliography. The Herculaneum corpus 
is best known for preserving a series of documents relating to a lawsuit 
brought by a young woman, Petronia Iusta. The literature on this lawsuit 
is enormous; a summary of the facts and a selection of literature may be 
found in Metzger (2005) 155-63; Lintott (2002) 560-565. The Puteoli 
tablets, a selection of which is discussed in this essay, were discovered in 
1959 near Pompeii. These have been meticulously edited and published 
with photographs and extensive supporting materials in Camodeca (1990), 
with a useful review at Rowe (2001), and a more brief review at Metzger 
(2001). The Puteoli corpus comprises documents recording private 
transactions and events in litigation; its contribution to our understanding 
of civil procedure is enormous. An extensive treatment of Roman tablets 
generally, and the Campanian tablets in particular, may be found in 
Meyer (2004). 
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Summons and delay 
From the time of the Twelve Tables, and throughout the period of 
the formulary procedure, a lawsuit would typically begin with in 
ius vocatio.6 This means simply that the plaintiff would bring the 
defendant in ius. If the defendant did not come, and did not offer a 
suitable person (vindex) to represent him, the magistrate might 
grant an action against the defendant, or indeed threaten 
additional remedies.7  
The common view is that summons by in ius vocatio was not 
only the means by which lawsuits typically began, but also the 
formal commencement of proceedings in iure. This view, however, 
credits the summons with greater significance than it possessed. 
The true picture is less tidy. For example, it was possible for a 
lawsuit to begin with a relatively informal “notice of the action,” 
under which the plaintiff, by one of various means, informs the 
defendant about the action he intends to bring against him.8 In 
such cases the notice, not the summons, would mark the 
beginning of the proceedings. A second example: a defendant 
might be vocatus more than once in the same lawsuit. There is a 
famous example in Horace (Sat. 1.9), where he relates how he was 
pestered in the street by a man who followed him about, even 
though the man was due to appear in iure. The man had 
apparently been vocatus in ius on some earlier occasion, because 
the appointment he was avoiding was not his first appointment in 
that lawsuit. Nevertheless, as he and Horace walk about, his 
adversary finds him and rapit in ius (1.9.77).9 
The third example is an especially significant one. We know 
that in ius vocatio was not the formal commencement of 
proceedings in iure, because a magistrate was not necessarily 
present to receive litigants. From a text of Ulpian we learn that 
the praetor gave a special remedy to litigants in local courts in 
Italy. Italian litigants, apparently, would occasionally arrive at 
 
6 XII Tab. 1.1-4. The text, commentary, and sources for in ius 
vocatio in the Twelve Tables may be found in Crawford (1996) vol. 2, 584-
90. The relevant Digest titles are Dig. 2.4-7. 
7 See Kaser and Hackl (1996) 222-225. Some textbooks recite an 
alternative to this procedure, under which the defendant makes a 
voluntary contract (a vadimonium) with the plaintiff to appear in court at 
a certain time. This view predates the discovery of documents from 
Herculaneum and Puteoli, and is disproved by them. See Metzger (2005) 
7-64. The arguments are well summarized in these reviews: Scott (2007); 
Robinson (2006); Harries (2007); Meyer (2008).  
8 Kaser and Hackl (1996) 220. This is discussed at length in the 
next section. 
9 See the extended discussion at Metzger (2005) 166-171. 
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the magistrate’s court, but could not have an audience with the 
magistrate, either because the crowds were too great, or because 
no magistrate was administering justice at that time. A plaintiff 
could feel the delay very keenly, because he might be under 
pressure to bring an action within a certain period of time. To the 
plaintiff who has lost his action in this unfortunate way, the 
praetor promises restitutio in integrum: 
Ait praetor: “sive cui per magistratus sine dolo malo ipsius 
actio exempta esse dicetur.” Hoc quo? Ut si per dilationes 
iudicis [sc. magistratus] effectum sit, ut actio eximatur, fiat 
restitutio. Sed et si magistratus copia non fuit, Labeo ait 
restitutionem faciendam. “Per magistratus” autem factum ita 
accipiendum est, si ius non dixit: alioquin si causa cognita 
denegavit actionem, restitutio cessat: et ita Servio videtur. 
Item per magistratus factum videtur, si per gratiam aut 
sordes magistratus ius non dixerit. (Dig. 4.6.26.4 [Ulp., 12 Ad 
ed.]) 
The praetor says: “Or if it is shown that an action was lost 
because of the magistrates, without fraud on [the claimant’s] 
part.” Why is this included? So that restitutio can be given 
when an action is lost by the delays created by a [magistrate]. 
Labeo says restitutio will also be given if magistrates were 
not available. Note that the words “because of the 
magistrates” should be understood to mean the failure to 
administer justice: if, on the other hand, the magistrate 
denied the action causa cognita, there will be no restitutio: 
this is Servius’ opinion. Moreover, something is regarded as 
done “because of the magistrates” also when the magistrate 
does not administer justice out of bias or corruption.  
The lesson is that in iure is sometimes a privileged place to be, 
and summons by in ius vocatio is not necessarily the “formal 
commencement” of anything at all.10 
Editio actionis 
One of the earliest events in the first phase of a lawsuit might 
take place far from any magistrate; it was a private matter 
between the parties. A plaintiff was obliged to tell the defendant 
about the action he intended to bring. 
 
10 For further discussion of restitutio in this text, and the very 
different remedy employed in first-century Spain, see Metzger (2005) 117-
119.  
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Qua quisque actione agere volet, eam edere debet: nam 
aequissimum videtur eum qui acturus est edere actionem, ut 
proinde sciat reus utrum cedere an contendere ultra debeat, 
et si contendendum putat, veniat instructus ad agendum 
cognita actione qua conveniatur. Edere est etiam copiam 
describendi facere vel in libello complecti et dare vel dictare. 
Eum quoque edere, Labeo ait, qui producat adversarium 
suum ad album et demonstret quod dictaturus est, vel id 
dicendo, quo uti velit. (Dig. 2.13.1pr.1 [Ulp., 4 Ad ed.]) 
Anyone who intends to bring an action should give notice of 
that action. For it seems quite fair for one who is about to sue 
to indicate the action, so that the defendant will then know 
whether he should give in or mount a defense, and should he 
decide on the latter, so that he will come to the contest 
prepared, with an understanding of the action with which he 
will be sued. One can give notice by providing the means for 
writing down, by expressing it in a written statement and 
handing it over, or by dictating it. Labeo even says that one 
gives notice when he brings his adversary to the album and 
points to what he would otherwise dictate, or says what he 
intends to use. 
This is the so-called editio actionis, or notice of the action. Ulpian 
states what were probably the main advantages of the rule — the 
possible avoidance of litigation, and barring that, a well-informed 
defendant. More generally, the proceedings before the magistrate, 
and particularly the settling of the words of the formula, would be 
intolerably slow and awkward if the defendant were learning then 
for the first time where his alleged liability lay.   
The institution of editio actionis perfectly illustrates the 
nature of the first phase, as well as the evolution in scholarship 
on civil procedure. Until recently a strikingly dogmatic view, 
championed by Moritz Wlassak and Otto Lenel, strongly 
influenced the common understanding of editio.11 This was the 
view that litis contestatio (“joinder of issue”), which closed the first 
phase, was a formal contract between the parties. Adherents of 
this view argued as follows. The contract was created by two acts: 
 
11 See Wlassak (1924) 72-104; Lenel (1894) 377. The argument is 
discussed at length and criticized in Jahr (1960) 165-206, but still holds 
sway in Cannata (1982) 143; Buti (1984) 193-94; Kaser and Hackl (1996) 
220-221, 232; and Barreiro (1999) 37-38. The argument is criticized in 
Bürge (1995). Bürge’s criticism is discussed briefly below. I have omitted 
any discussion of the second of Bürge’s subjects, the disclosure of evidence 
(editio instrumentorum).  
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the edere iudicium of the plaintiff, and the accipere iudicium of 
the defendant. The edere iudicium “mirrored” the editio actionis 
described by Ulpian in the passage just quoted. Under each, the 
plaintiff informed the defendant about the nature of the action he 
intended to bring, and under each, the available methods for 
giving the information were largely the same (the exception being 
producere ad album, which was restricted to editio actionis). 
Crucially, however, the editio actionis was informal and took place 
at the time of summons. It was merely the “vorbereitende Edition” 
(“preliminary notice”), to be distinguished from the “endgültige 
Edition” (“final notice”), which was formal, took place in the 
presence of the magistrate, and contributed to litis contestatio.12 
Thus the view prevailed that editio was a two-fold act, first 
performed informally out-of-court, then performed formally before 
the magistrate. 
The two-fold editio had doubters, but it was only in 1995 that 
Alfons Bürge put the idea to rest. Bürge’s study of editio is 
valuable not only for what it brings to the subject itself, but also 
for our understanding of space. Briefly, Bürge argues that the 
parties would enjoy a degree of freedom of decision-making or 
“Spielraum” in the formulation of their claims and defenses, up 
until those claims and defenses were made firm at litis 
contestatio. In effect, the editio actionis was an opportunity and 
catalyst for advancing the suit in the direction of (if not in fact to) 
some resolution. A plaintiff might use this freedom of decision-
making to change the nature of the action he intended to bring; a 
defendant, to negotiate some kind of settlement. Bürge also gives 
less obvious examples: representatives who have the freedom to 
contrive to their principal’s advantage without being bound to a 
particular editio; debtors who admit the debt announced to them 
by editio, and thereby avoid the charge of recalcitrance, as well as 
winning some additional time to pay.13 This is the kind of 
“Spielraum” that the sources on editio describe; there is no 
warrant for a supposed two-fold, informal-then-formal editio, nor 
the exaggerated spatial distinction between “in court” and “out of 
court” that the view presumes. “When we leave off supposing that 
a two-fold editio is attested anywhere in the sources, it becomes 
clear how the subject of the lawsuit is gradually finalized through 
the parties’ interaction. We can view the editio requirement with 
emphasis on the parties’ interaction, the product of private 
 
12 As Bürge points out, there has never been any direct evidence for 
the two types of editio. The theory is built largely on logical argument. See 
Bürge (1995) 2-3. 
13 Bürge (1995) 7-8, 14-16.  
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autonomy, or we can focus more on those acts of the magistrate 
that bring that preliminary activity to an end, but it makes very 
little difference which we do.”14 
Interrogatio in iure 
If the parties cannot settle their dispute during this preliminary 
phase, a plaintiff may use his power of summons to bring the 
defendant to the magistrate. Many plaintiffs, having done so, will 
need nothing more from the magistrate than a formula and an 
“order to judge” directed at some suitable local man.15 But others 
may have more specific business to conduct, and the document 
quoted below, from first-century Puteoli, records an example. The 
interrogatio in iure that the document records took place in the 
magistrate’s presence, and is included here to show the obverse of 
the editio described above, which could take place virtually 
anywhere. That certain events in the first phase took place in the 
magistrate’s presence is obvious; the value of the quoted 
document lies in the fact that, exceptionally, it declares on its face 
that the events took place in iure, and even names the magistrate. 
In iure apud Lucium Granium Probum duumvirum Gaius 
Sulpicius Faustus interrogavit Aulum Castricium Onesimum 
essetne heres Aulo Castricio Isochryso et quota ex parte. 
Aulus Castricius Onesimus respondit se ex parte XII Aulo 
Castricio Isochryso et ex parte XXIV partis quintae heredem 
esse. (TPSulp. 23) (35 CE).16 
In iure before Lucius Granius Probus, duumvir, Gaius 
Sulpicius Faustus questioned Aulus Castricius Onesimus as 
to whether he was heir to Aulus Castricius Isochrysus and to 
what share. Aulus Castricius Onesimus answered that he 
was heir to Aulo Castricius Isochrysus to the share (1/12 + 
1/24) ÷ 5. 
 
14 Bürge (1995) 43-44 (emphasis added): “Verzichtet man darauf, 
eine in den Quellen nirgends belegte Zweiteilung der editio zu postulieren, 
tritt deutlicher hervor, wie das Prozeßthema im Zuge der Interaktion der 
Parteien allmählich verfertigt wird. Ob wir nun beim Zwang zur editio 
mehr den Akzent auf die von der Privatautonomie getragene Interaktion 
zwischen den Parteien legen, oder ob wir mehr auf die Handlungen des 
Gerichtsmagistraten achten, die das Vorverfahren abschließen, tut vorerst 
wenig zur Sache.” 
15 The best surviving example of a formula, including the iudicare 
iubere, is TPSulp. 31 (52 CE), at Camodeca (1990) 97-98. 
16 Camodeca (1990) 79-80. 
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An interrogatio was required in certain cases to establish facts for 
the forthcoming trial, and also to help the plaintiff to decide 
whether he should proceed to trial or not. Here, Gaius Sulpicius 
Faustus is probably a creditor of Aulus Castricius Isochrysus, and 
is keen to determine to what degree the heirs of his debtor may be 
liable.17 He must make this inquiry in the magistrate’s presence. 
Postponement 
The natural end to the first phase is the drafting of a formula and 
joinder of issue. Not every pair of litigants is so fortunate, 
however. When the end of the day arrives, or when a magistrate is 
required to leave for some reason, there may still be groups of 
litigants nearby, either waiting their turn, or negotiating with 
each other. This is an awkward time, because the litigants know 
they will have to reassemble on some day in the future. The 
plaintiff, who is seeking an action or other remedy, does not need 
any special inducement to return, but the defendant of course 
feels differently. It is an easy matter for the defendant to make 
himself difficult to find, and he might even hope to “run out the 
clock,” i.e., remain out of the way until the plaintiff’s action is 
time-barred, or until some event hinders its prosecution.18 The 
solution to this awkwardness is a simple one, and is described by 
Gaius. 
Cum autem in ius vocatus fuerit adversarius neque eo die 
finiri potuerit negotium, vadimonium ei faciendum est, id est, 
ut promittat se certo die sisti. (Gaius, Inst. 4.184) 
However, when the defendant has been called in ius, but 
matters cannot be completed on that day, a vadimonium 
must be made to him, that is, so that he promises to be 
present on a particular day. 
A vadimonium was a stipulation-and-promise: a plaintiff asked 
the defendant whether he would promise to return on a certain 
day, and the defendant gave the promise. To that extent, it was a 
very ordinary private contract. But the contract was not a 
voluntary act, rather it was ordered to be performed by the 
magistrate: vadimonium ei faciendum est. This terse formula 
 
17 See Dig. 11.1.1pr (Call., 2 Ed. monit.); Camodeca (1990) 83. 
18 The Roman legal system was not of course helpless against 
recalcitrant defendants; see the edictal provisions cited in Lenel (1927) 
415-16. But there is reason to think that the more severe measures were 
cumbersome to enforce. See the discussion at Metzger (2005) 170. 
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reappears in virtually all of the surviving vadimonium documents 
from Herculaneum and Puteoli.19 One imagines that the litigants 
were ordered to perform their vadimonia with some variant of 
these words, that they did so, and that they duly recorded the fact 
that they had performed what they were ordered to perform. 
We run into a problem when we try to visualize many groups 
of litigants, all making these contracts at the same time, at the 
end of the day. Our first thought is perhaps that the litigants 
formed a line, and that each pair stood in front of the magistrate 
for a moment as he addressed them, telling each pair to make a 
contract. Happily, this does not appear to have been the case. 
With the help of new evidence, we now suspect that 
postponements were ordered en masse. 
The new evidence that made this understanding possible is 
the lex Irnitana, discovered 25 years ago. It is a first-century 
“town charter” for a small municipium in Baetica, and contains a 
great deal of material describing how civil lawsuits were 
conducted.20 The following excerpt is from a provision on 
postponements. 
Quicumque in eo municipio duumvir iure dicundo praerit […] 
intertium dato. Idque proscriptum in eo loco, in quo ius dicet, 
maiore parte cuiusque diei per omnes dies, per quos intertium 
dari debebit, habeto ita ut de plano recte legi possit. (Lex 
Irnitana 90.27–31) 
Whichever duumvir in that municipium is in charge of 
administering justice […] shall grant three-day 
postponements. And he shall publish it, in the place where he 
administers justice, for the greater part of each day, 
throughout all days on which he is supposed to grant three-
day postponements, so that it can be read from ground level. 
For present purposes, the most important new item of information 
given us by the lex Irnitana is the magistrate’s obligation to 
perform a postponement once per day.21 At the end of a sitting, he 
 
19 See Metzger (2005) appendix, Nos. 9-18, 20-24, 34-37. The formula 
has been discussed and debated for many years; the most recent 
discussions are in Platschek (2001); Metzger (2005) 55-63. Readers should 
note that Richard Neudecker, in this volume, interprets the vadimonia set 
out in these documents as substitutes for summons, rather than devices to 
aid postponements.  At one time, it was indeed the common view to read 
the documents as Neudecker does. See Meyer (2008) 101-102.  
20 The leading critical texts are González (1986); Lamberti (1993). 
21 This much debated portion of the lex Irnitana is discussed 
thoroughly in Metzger (2005) 111-135. 
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would postpone pending matters until the day-after-the-next. A 
single, collective postponement is a powerful device. It allows an 
orderly exit of litigants at the end of the day, their vadimonia 
duly (and simultaneously) performed. And because the 
performance of vadimonia can be compelled en masse, no litigant 
requires a personal audience with the magistrate.22 We come to 
appreciate that litigants can come and go, day after day, their 
lawsuits very much alive, yet never have a face-to-face meeting 
with the magistrate. 
A Settlement Agreement from Puteoli 
The argument of this essay is a very simple one: it is a mistake to 
assume that one who acts outside the presence of a magistrate is 
necessarily acting outside litigation. One document from the 
Puteoli archive illustrates the point well. It does so because it 
contains enough internal evidence to allow us to place the events 
squarely in the middle of litigation, but also out of the presence of 
the magistrate. The document records the giving of an oath, called 
a iusiurandum in iure (“oath in iure”). The institution requires a 
brief introduction.23 
The iusiurandum in iure does not attract much notice in the 
literature; it was a limited and self-contained act, important only 
to the participants, and it employed a sui generis legal language. 
The purpose of the oath was to remove certain matters from 
litigation. The two contesting parties could agree to put any fact 
or facts out of dispute, and equally they could decide to put any 
legal conclusion out of dispute (i.e., to agree that the defendant 
 
22 The notice which the magistrate was obliged to publish for the 
better part of the day remains somewhat mysterious. Something like the 
following is possible: In VIII kalendas Iulias vadimonia fieri iubebo, or 
less specifically: In diem tertium sive perendinum vadimonia fieri iubebo. 
For the phrase vadimonia fieri iubebo see Val. Prob., De Notis Iuris 6.63 
(V.F.I. vadimonium fieri iubere). For details on notice in the lex Irnitana, 
see Metzger (2007) 200-203.  
23 The principal evidence is in Dig. 12.2, though that title also 
contains fragments of discussion of different oaths, insufficiently 
distinguished from one another by Justinian’s compilers. The edict on the 
specific oath discussed here, along with model formulae, is given in Lenel 
(1927) 149-151. Kaser gives a sound discussion of the institution, though 
not entirely up-to-date: Kaser and Hackl (1996) 266-269. The word 
iusiurandum is used in a wide number of contexts which have nothing to 
do with the specific institution under discussion; see Kaser and Hackl 
(1996) 266 note 1. 
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did not owe a debt was probably a typical use).24 They could of 
course also put the entire controversy out of dispute, and not 
proceed to litigation at all. While there is perhaps little in the 
iusiurandum for a modern lawyer to admire and remark on,25 to 
the Romans the institution was probably an important one. The 
reason is that it afforded the parties a degree of secrecy that the 
publicity of the in iure proceeding and trial would spoil. Any 
details in a legal affair that embarrassed or diminished one’s 
reputation could be hidden from view by a iusiurandum. This is 
an important and underremarked aspect of the institution.26 
There were two types of iusiurandum in iure, treated in 
different parts of the edict and subject to different rules.27 The one 
that concerns us here is the so-called voluntary iusiurandum in 
iure, undertaken at the will of the parties. At its simplest it 
worked as follows. A plaintiff invited the defendant to give an 
oath denying the claim or allegation against him. This was called 
the delatio or the tendering of the oath, and was required to 
contain the very words that the defendant was invited to swear. If 
the defendant gave the oath as tendered, he prevailed on that 
claim or allegation. The same process worked in reverse: a 
defendant might tender an oath to the plaintiff, inviting him to 
swear to the justness of a claim or allegation. Again, if the 
plaintiff swore the oath as tendered, he would prevail. If the 
entire controversy were settled in this way, the oath was as good 
as a judgment, and the magistrate would enforce it with an 
appropriate action, and block any effort to reopen the matter with 
an appropriate defense. When pressed, the only matter the 
magistrate would revisit was the existence of the oath itself. 
 
24 The earliest attested uses of these oaths (if the institution is 
indeed the same) are in Plautus and concern debtors who glibly “swear off” 
their debts. Plaut., Rud. 13-20: [Arcturus:] Qui falsas litis falsis 
testimoniis / petunt quique in iure abiurant pecuniam, / eorum referimus 
nomina exscripta ad Iovem; / cotidie ille scit quis hic quaerat malum: / 
qui hic litem apisci postulant peiurio / mali, res falsas qui impetrant apud 
iudicem, / iterum ille eam rem iudicatam iudicat; / maiore multa multat 
quam litem auferunt. See also Persa 478; Curc. 496. 
25 Watson (1992) 48: “The [iusiurandum in iure] has nothing 
remarkable about it and we need not linger over it.” 
26 See Greenidge (1901) 260. See also Dig. 12.2.15 (Paul., 6 Ad ed.): 
Ad personas egregias eosque qui valetudine impediuntur domum mitti 
oportet ad iurandum. 
27 In the edictal commentaries, Book 18 of Paul and 22 of Ulpian 
treat the iusiurandum under discussion here. The other was a so-called 
compulsory oath, enforced by the magistrate in specific suits, and carrying 
a sting for the party who refused to swear an oath as tendered. 
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The document given below is one of a pair of oath documents 
from Puteoli, both dated 49 CE.28 The surviving portions of our 
document record the tendering of an oath; its companion, 
inscribed in the same hand some weeks after the first document, 
describes the swearing of an oath. The documents appear to come 
from the same lawsuit, but whether they belong to the same oath 
is unclear.29 Discussion of the first of the documents is sufficient 
for our purposes.30 
Cum ad vadimonium ventum esset, quod haberet Gaius 
Sulpicius Cinnamus cum Lucio Patulcio Fortunato, et Gaius 
Sulpicius Cinnamus diceret se paratum esse iurare, ita ut 
convenisset, si sibi HS 3,000 nummum darentur, Lucius 
Patulcius Fortunatus ei iusiurandum pecunia… detulit in 
foro apud statuam Matris Idaeae Magnae (TPSulp. 28) (49 
CE) 
When Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus had appeared to his bail, 
which he had with Lucius Patulcius Fortunatus, and Gaius 
Sulpicius Cinnamus said he was ready to swear, as it had 
been agreed, if 3,000 sesterces were given to him, Lucius 
Patulcius Fortunatus tendered to him an oath… money… in 
the forum by the statue of Mater Idaea Magna. 
The following is what the document appears to describe. 
Cinnamus is the defendant, and Fortunatus is the plaintiff.31 
Cinnamus is indicating his willingness to give an oath: he is 
“prepared to swear.”32 The particular matter to which Cinnamus 
is prepared to swear is not preserved, though on our 
understanding of this institution, the oath would fall to his 
benefit. This latter fact, and the fact that Cinnamus is defendant, 
makes it rather puzzling that, as a condition to giving the oath, 
 
28 TPSulp. 28, 29. See Camodeca (1990) 93-96. 
29 Wolf (2001) 103. 
30 The text is a composite of Camodeca (1990) 93-94; Wolf (2001) 105; 
Camodeca (2000) 183-184. It is in the later of his readings that Camodeca 
gives in [foro apu]d statuam [Matris Ida]eae magnae. The tablet is a 
diptych; the second tablet is badly preserved.  
31 Compare Gröschler (2004) 124-125. But see Metzger (2007) 189-
190 note 12. 
32 There is an echo here of a text of Paul (Dig. 12.2.6 [19 Ad ed.]), 
which describes an oath with the timing reversed. The party who intends 
to swear indicates his willingness to do so (cum paratus esset adversarius 
iurare) and his opponent tenders. The oath itself is said to be “remitted” in 
this instance. If this is indeed what is described in our document, as 
Camodeca (1990) 94, states, then Cinnamus will not have been required to 
swear the oath in order for the settlement to be complete. 
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Cinnamus must receive 3,000 sesterces, perhaps from Fortunatus. 
The matter of the 3,000 sesterces remains a mystery.33 
For present purposes what matters is (1) when these events 
took place, and (2) where they took place. The principal clue for 
the time of the events is the opening: Cum ad vadimonium 
ventum esset, quod haberet Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus cum Lucio 
Patulcio Fortunato. As already discussed, a vadimonium was a 
promise by a defendant, and ordered by a magistrate, to reappear 
on some future occasion for a continuation of the first phase. The 
defendant Cinnamus has therefore made some earlier appearance 
in the first phase, perhaps several such appearances. The opening 
words, in fact, use a formula that is familiar from other Puteoli 
documents (vadimonium quod X haberet cum Y34), a formula 
which records that X, the defendant, has indeed met the 
appointment he promised to Y, the plaintiff, and protects the 
defendant from a claim of recalcitrance. Thus our document 
attests both Cinnamus meeting his vadimonium, and Fortunatus 
tendering an oath, both events taking place after the lawsuit is 
well underway.35 
The place or places at which the events occurred can be partly 
reconstructed. It is well known from the epigraphic evidence from 
Herculaneum and Puteoli, and from some literary sources as well, 
that a defendant who promised by vadimonium to return on some 
day in the future would ordinarily promise to appear at some 
landmark (an altar, a statue, a mural), rather than directly at the 
magistrate’s tribunal.36 In Puteoli, the most common meeting 
 
33  Humbert offers two alternative solutions; the first of these posits 
that there is some relation between the parties, other than which is 
treated in the oath, that explains the 3,000 sesterces; e.g., Cinnamus is 
Fortunatus’ creditor. See Humbert (2000) 124. The second alternative 
assumes that the two oath tablets are related, which a cautious 
interpretation would exclude. See above note 29 and accompanying text, 
and the discussion in note 32.  
34 See TPSulp. 18, 20, 21: so-called testationes sistendi. 
35 This latter point — that the suit is underway at the time the 
events took place — is a matter of some small debate. Certain writers, 
who adhere to the view that a plaintiff used the vadimonium to bring a 
defendant to his first appearance in iure (see the discussion in note 7 
above), would interpret these events as preliminary to the lawsuit. See 
Humbert (2000) 122-124 and Camodeca (2000) 183-184, and the 
discussion at Metzger (2007). 
36 See Metzger (2005) 16-17; the reasons for the practice are 
discussed ibid., 53-54. The most obvious reason is perhaps the intolerable 
crowds it would create if parties and their witness converged on the 
magistrate at the same time. The evidence for the practice is discussed 
extensively in Cloud (2002). On the Herculaneum tablets specifically, see 
also Bablitz (2007) 20-21. 
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place named in the surviving documents is in foro ante aram 
[Augusti] Hordionianam.37 No meeting place is named in the 
document under discussion, though the place at which the 
tendering of the oath took place (reconstructed by Camodeca: in 
foro apud statuam Matris Idaeae Magnae, not otherwise known) 
is indeed mentioned. One supposes that the location of the parties’ 
meeting, and the location of the oath-tendering, are not the same 
location, if only because the first of these locations would be 
crowded with other litigants, themselves meeting their bail, and 
because parties who participate in a voluntary iusiurandum in 
iure would, in many cases, value their privacy. In any event, 
Cinnamus and Fortunatus are settling their lawsuit, or some 
aspect of it, outside the magistrate’s presence. 
The lesson of this document is clear. The parties are in the 
middle of litigation, having commenced the first phase of the 
lawsuit on some earlier occasion, and having met, on the day, in 
compliance with a compulsory order to reappear. They are 
nevertheless conducting their business by themselves, outside the 
presence of the magistrate. Their oath is intrinsic to their 
litigation. The magistrate will not allow Fortunatus to reopen the 
matter to which Cinnamus has sworn. This is not a “private 
transaction,” notwithstanding its location. 
Conclusion 
Earlier writers on Roman procedure were handicapped by the 
scarcity of the evidence. The Digest is our principal source for the 
classical law, and it was systematically stripped of procedure by 
Justinian’s compilers. What remained behind were little “islands” 
of institutions, like editio, interrogatio, and iusiurandum. It 
seemed to early writers that anything procedural worth 
remarking on was taking place in iure; this is how the priorities of 
the Roman jurists made themselves felt in modern scholarship. 
Thus the proceedings in iure came to be equated with the entirety 
of the first phase, and the fiction arose that a suit commonly 
passed from in ius vocatio to formula largely uninterrupted. New 
evidence has allowed us to appreciate that the first phase took 
place both in and out of the magistrate’s court. It was a far less 
orderly, and a far more sprawling affair, than earlier writers 
appreciated. 
 
37 TPSulp. 1, 1 bis, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9?, 10, 11. 
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